Problems that once seemed parochial now matter to the rest of the world–from homegrown jihads to organized crime. When it comes to thugs and thuggery, it really is a small world after all. For example, in a recent report to NATO, Gwen McClure, an FBI agent seconded to Interpol to fight organized crime, makes some stunning connections based on police intelligence from around the globe. She cites, for instance, a meeting in Albania in the late 1990s between regional criminal bosses–who are heavily involved in drug running, gun smuggling and people trafficking–and several terrorist leaders from Algeria. “It was during this meeting,” says McClure, “that many structures and networks were established for providing the Algerian armed groups with logistical support.” According to McClure, intelligence reports put bin Laden in Albania at that time, and possibly at that meeting.
Corruption and crime always feed political chaos, and chaos breeds the peculiarly ruthless organization of crime. Terrorism often hides and thrives on the lawless roads ruled by gang leaders, warlords and godfathers. But the terrorists brought together by bin Laden systematically use activities as petty as credit-card fraud, as cruel as kidnapping, as vast as the heroin trade, to underwrite their atrocities. And, just like the conscienceless mafias of the world, they’ve learned to operate without borders.
Not all local conflicts will become the preoccupation of war and policy planners in Washington. Not all failed states offering refuge and a training ground for terror lords and suicide commandos will become international priorities. But far from Afghanistan–in Somalia, the Philippines and Algeria–America and its allies will find old fronts in this new world war.
Somalia: The Badlands Somalia is a country overrun by warlords. Its fields are parched, its cities wrecked. Refugees have fled to surrounding countries, and hundreds of thousands of people need food aid to stave off starvation. In the badlands to the south, Islamic radicals have set up armed camps, which have been attended by Arab militants. In these and other ways, Somalia is a mini-Afghanistan. “This place is a black hole,” says an aid worker. “It has no links to Interpol, no extradition treaties, no government authority you can share information with. It’s a place where extremist groups come to hide.”
It’s also a place that American forces know well. The United States launched Operation Restore Hope in 1992 to save Somalis from starvation. But American and United Nations forces soon got mired in clan politics. In October 1993, U.S. forces tried to capture two lieutenants of warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, but instead engaged in a vicious overnight street battle in Mogadishu. Hundreds of Somalis were killed, many of them unarmed civilians. And Somali fighters armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades killed 18 Americans, dragging the corpse of one soldier before a video camera.
Few were happier about that than bin Laden, who later told an interviewer that his Arab holy warriors helped “prey on” U.S. forces in Mogadishu. (Bin Laden has also repeatedly crowed over the American “humiliation” in Somalia, calling it proof that America can be beaten.) There is no evidence at all that Arabs from bin Laden’s organization, Al Qaeda, participated in the street fighting that took place that October. But it is widely accepted that Arab militants provided training and arms to clan militias opposed to the United States. And a New York indictment against bin Laden and several of his cohorts–in connection with the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998–alleges that Al Qaeda leaders helped set up training camps in Somalia in early 1993.
Somalia is home to several fundamentalist groups. The largest is Al Ittihad al Islami, which was included in President George W. Bush’s recent executive order freezing the assets of terrorist groups. Al Ittihad has divisions within its own ranks–between those who want to focus on establishing a fundamentalist society in Somalia and those who favor a more “internationalist” agenda. At least some members of Al Ittihad appear to have direct links to bin Laden’s network, although the exact nature of those connections is murky. Fighters from Al Ittihad have run several military camps in Somalia, and foreign extremists have been seen coming and going from areas under their control. (It is believed that bin Laden himself visited Somalia in 1999 to see if he could relocate there, but he apparently decided that he’d be too easily betrayed.) According to Somali and other sources, two fundamentalist camps are located along the Kenyan border, which is a wild and ungoverned region. The worry is that such facilities could serve a similar purpose to camps in Afghanistan–to train and export terrorists.
One camp is located at Ras Komboni in the far southwest. Until recently, according to Somali and other sources, a leader of Al Ittihad named Hassan Turki ran the place. Little is known about what happens in the camp, but Turki (which may be a nickname) is regarded as one of Al Ittihad’s military experts. Somalis in the area of Ras Komboni reported seeing reconnaissance planes overflying the area in early October. After that, Somali and other sources say, Turki and others cleared out of the camp. Turki himself has been reported in Mogadishu; according to one report, he recently left Somalia for Yemen.
Other fundamentalists in Somalia come in many guises. They include small extremist groups, like a branch of the militant organization Al Takfir wal Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight), as well as a moderate Pakistani group that does peaceful missionary work. Several Arab-funded organizations provide much-needed schooling to Somali children, as well as food and medical care. Some also give the kids a dose of fiery anti-Western views, and require their families to obey severe Muslim dress codes, which have never been widely followed in Somalia. (Many Somalis mockingly call women who cover themselves head to toe “ninjas.”)
All of which makes Somalia a country that U.S. forces will be loath to return to–except maybe in bombers at 10,000 feet. And that won’t accomplish much, except to stir up anti-American anger along with a few dust clouds. Some Somalis, however, believe that any attention from America would be welcome. “In a perverse way, they think that if they get into a war with America, then America may help build the country after it’s over,” says a United Nations official. “They think that perhaps America will see the vacuum that exists and give a helping hand.”
Philippines: A Little Help The show and tell came as no surprise. After a skirmish with the Islamic guerrilla group Abu Sayyaf last year, the Philippine military proudly showed reporters its quarry: two of the guerrillas, blindfolded and bound, sprawled on the floor of a straw hut. The scene was meant to hammer home what the military had been saying all along. With only 800 members, many of them youngsters, Abu Sayyaf was not a fearsome adversary. Nonetheless, after two “all-out wars,” the government has failed to defeat them. So it was with a mixture of newfound humility and eagerness that Philippine officials last week greeted 26 U.S. military advisers, the first wave of American assistance.
Their fight is now an American one. Starting in the Philippines, the United States is seeking to widen its war against terror to include other groups with connections to bin Laden’s Qaeda network. Abu Sayyaf makes a tempting target. Funded by bin Laden’s brother-in-law Jamal Khalifa, the group has kidnapped and executed Americans and Filipinos, extorting millions of dollars to buy state-of-the-art weapons. Philippine commanders, who have had to fight with decades-old equipment, expect that the guerrillas will be easy prey for an American-led and -equipped campaign. Says national-security adviser Roilo Golez: “We should see results soon.”
But the United States could find itself embroiled in an open-ended conflict. Abu Sayyaf claims it is fighting for an independent Muslim state. That’s also the aim of a much larger group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which commands a modern army of 11,000 men. The MILF is in peace talks with Manila. But any threat to its territory or power–such as a better-equipped Philippine military seeking to consolidate its hold over the south–could inflame tensions. “The MILF wants to make sure it will not be affected by the new U.S.-backed campaign,” says Zamzamin Ampatuan, head of the Office of Muslim Affairs.
Bin Laden has already shown his ability to send chaos to Asia. According to the Philippine military and Abu Sayyaf, in March 1997 he sent two suicide fighters to inspire MILF soldiers, who were then suffering from low morale after the military occupied their second largest camp. (The MILF has repeatedly denied any connections with bin Laden.) The two fighters, Abu Maryam Al-misri, an Egyptian, and Mohamed Gharib Ibrahim Sayed-Ahmed, a Saudi, stayed with the MILF until Oct. 14, when the visitors attacked an Army base. Firing a grenade into the base, Abu Maryam distracted a sentry, while Gharib sneaked behind the guardhouse and shot the sentry in the head. The two ended up killing three soldiers and wounding six before being shot to death. “We knew they had been trained well,” says Capt. Noel Detoyato, who was at the base. “They were shot several times but kept going.” The attack was meant as an inspiration to all Muslims. Says a senior military official: “We are sure they were here to show Filipino Muslims that they were concerned about them, but it was also a way to teach about suicide attacks in general.”
That kind of example could make the U.S.-backed campaign more difficult. It is still unclear what form American involvement will take. (Earlier this year, Washington spent $1.8 million training 45 Philippine antiterrorist commandos.) But even the imminent arrival of the advisers seemed to provoke violence. A bomb exploded near the airport where the Americans landed just hours later. Lt. Gen. Roy Cimatu, chief of the Southern Command, saw the blast as a final burst of defiance before the American effort begins. “This is an indication of an ending,” he says, “checkmate.” Or the beginning of a more desperate game.
Mahlon Meyer with Marites Vitug
Algeria: Bloody Stalemate The commando steps from a bulletproof 4x4, his hands hitched into his vest bulging with Kalashnikov clips. “Where are you from?” he asks a journalist. When he hears “the United States,” he points proudly to his sleek black body armor. “This is from America, too. I was in America, in Washington D.C.,” says Khaled, as he calls himself. A member of Algeria’s elite GIS–the Special Intervention Group, created in 1988 to fight terrorism–he is one of hundreds of Algerian troops who train with U.S. forces every year. “These are our Rangers, our SAS,” says one official. Their goal: to find terrorists and eradicate them.
For a decade the West has all but ignored one of the world’s bloodiest terrorist battlefields, and one of the murkiest. The forces the GIS are hunting, members of the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, and a radical offshoot led by a man named Hassan Hattab, are increasingly linked to the networks of Osama bin Laden. But in the past, they have also been linked to Algerian-government infiltrators in a guerrilla conflict that has cost up to 150,000 lives. A senior French intelligence official tells NEWSWEEK there is little doubt that in one infamous GIA attack–the hijacking of an Air France plane from Algiers to Marseilles in 1994, which many analysts see as a precedent for the Sept. 11 attacks–the terrorists were initially helped by members of the Algerian security services.
That makes figuring out how to fight on the Algerian front all the more difficult for Washington. While the Algerians have been clamoring for American military aid for years, the United States has been reluctant to provide lethal assistance for fear it could fall into the wrong hands. Until now. This week the White House is expected to announce a meeting between Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and George W. Bush for Nov. 5. Sources tell NEWSWEEK that the primary aim of the meeting is to discuss increased cooperation against terrorism. U.S. officials are examining providing Humvees and more sophisticated equipment, like night-vision technology. “We need infrared technology, satellite technology,” says an Algerian official.
Ten years ago this fight didn’t seem to have much to do with the United States. The Algerian military canceled elections in 1991 rather than see them won by the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front, and the country was swept into a horrific civil war. The core of many guerrilla units was made up of jihadists freshly returned from the battlefields of Afghanistan. The government began a ruthless campaign of repression to root out and eradicate anyone perceived as a threat. The worst years of the atrocities–committed by both sides–ended in the mid-1990s. But the fighting isn’t over. “It’s a never-ending guerrilla war here,” said one Algerian military-security official last week.
The soldiers trying to kill them say the terrorists rarely travel in groups of more than 10 or so. They move at night and live in caves or man-made dugouts. But helping the Algerians get these groups may come at a price. One of the FBI’s most-wanted men, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, is currently in prison in Algeria, where he mysteriously appeared in March. Dahoumane is wanted in connection with the millennium plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport. Without an extradition treaty, the Algerians have refused to deliver him.
