Army and air force planners argue that other Somali cities could have been occupied much more quickly by army airborne troops, such as the Rangers or the 82nd Airborne Division. Sources say the army offered to send such troops to Somalia, but Gen. Joseph Hoar, the Marine who oversees the operation as head of the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Fla., turned them down. “We’re letting service politics play this out,” charges a disgruntled Pentagon official. “There is no other way you can explain this excruciatingly slow operation. Because the Marines didn’t get to exercise an amphibious landing in the Persian Gulf, we let them do it in Somalia. If you’re the Marines, and you want to sell everyone on this wonderful amphibious capability, you can’t have the army upstage you with an airborne division.”
General Hoar insists that his troops had to establish a secure base before moving out into the countryside, and he says most of the operation is “ahead of schedule.” Other defenders of the Marine position note that airborne troops carry only several days’ worth of supplies, while the Marines, with their pre-positioned cargo ships, are better equipped for a long stay in a harsh country. They also argue that a sudden, multicity assault might have trapped the gunmen, leading to pitched battles. And many Somalis, especially the Islamic fundamentalists, might have been persuaded that the Americans were bent on conquest. The Marines will never forget what happened in Beirut nine years ago, when 241 Americans were killed at their barracks by one Muslim fanatic driving a truck full of explosives.
